The inflation target trap. CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2017 by Gros, Daniel.
 12 July 2017 
 
Daniel Gros is Director of CEPS. An earlier version of this Commentary was published on the Project 
Syndicate website, 2 June 2017, and is republished on the CEPS website with the kind permission of 
Project Syndicate. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. As 
an institution, CEPS takes no official position on questions of EU policy. The views expressed are 
attributable only to the authors and not to any institution with which they are associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2017 
CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
The Inflation Target Trap 
Daniel Gros 
Noting that the recovery of the euro area is gathering strength and that deflation no longer 
seems a danger, Daniel Gros calls upon the ECB to exit its emergency policies now. 
Central banks have a problem: growth in much of the world is accelerating, but inflation has 
failed to take off. Of course, for most people, growth without inflation is the ideal combination. 
But central banks have set the goal of achieving an inflation rate of “below, but close to 2%”, 
as the European Central Bank puts it. And, at this point, it is hard to see how that can be 
achieved. 
Central banks never pretended that they could steer inflation directly. But they thought that by 
providing rock-bottom interest rates and generous liquidity conditions in the wake of the 2008 
global financial crisis, they could push investment and consumption upward. In 2009, when 
financial markets were in turmoil and the economy was in free-fall, the US Federal Reserve took 
matters a step further, initiating large-scale asset purchases, or quantitative easing (QE). The 
ECB followed suit in 2014-15, when deflation appeared (wrongly, in hindsight) to threaten the 
eurozone. 
The actions of the Federal Reserve certainly helped to stabilise financial markets and the ECB 
also claims that its bond buying, once financial markets had normalised, sparked economic 
growth and fostered employment. But the impact ended there. The tightening of the labour 
market should have led to higher wages, which would ultimately translate into higher prices. 
But this mechanism, the so-called Phillips curve, seems to have broken down. In both the 
United States and Japan, despite low unemployment, wages are not increasing, at least not at 
the rate indicated by historical experience. And the wage increases that are occurring, such as 
in the US, are not having the impact on prices that one would expect. 
The reasons for this are not well understood. Last year, low oil prices could be blamed; but even 
when oil prices rebounded somewhat, inflation remained low. Another, more structural 
explanation is that the prices of the goods comprising a large part of the consumer price index 
tend to fall over time, because they can increasingly be produced efficiently in low-wage 
countries, particularly in Asia. In addition, retailers’ margins are being squeezed, owing to 
competition from online shops. 
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This problem of ‘missing inflation’ is especially acute in the eurozone and Japan. Because the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the ECB have defined success exclusively in terms of achieving their 
inflation target, they now face a dilemma. The ECB, in particular, has little choice today but to 
continue its expansionary policies, including QE, until it sees some sustained increase in 
inflation. 
For the Fed, the problem is less severe. The US is experiencing somewhat higher inflation than 
are the eurozone and Japan, and the Fed has a dual mandate: not just price stability, but also 
full employment. Having achieved the latter, it can declare at least half a victory and gradually 
start lifting rates. 
But there is another reason why missing inflation is more of a problem for the eurozone. During 
the bubble years before the 2007 crisis, prices and wages increased sharply in the eurozone 
periphery, relative to Germany, which was plagued, then, by high unemployment and stagnant 
wages. Over time those economies became uncompetitive and could not cope when capital 
inflows suddenly stopped, requiring them to increase exports. 
Now Germany is practically at full employment, but wages are not increasing at much more 
than 2% – far lower than the 5% rate that prevailed when Germany last had such low 
employment (below 4%), nearly 30 years go. The resulting lack of inflation is not only 
contributing to Germany’s very high current-account surplus; it is also making it harder for the 
peripheral countries to improve their competitive position vis-à-vis Germany. 
The ECB must set its monetary policy on the basis of the eurozone average. But it would clearly 
be more comfortable if the competitive imbalances that arose during the boom years were 
corrected more quickly, and most European policymakers would welcome some rebalancing as 
well. 
But the real question is not whether it would be desirable for inflation in the euro area to come 
closer to 2%. Massive bond buying by the central bank is a policy for desperate times. Today, 
the economic environment is totally different than it was just a few years ago: financial markets 
are buoyant, financing conditions are highly favourable, the economy is expanding 
satisfactorily, and there is no sign of deflation. 
In a recent speech, ECB President Mario Draghi observed that reflationary dynamics are “slowly 
taking hold”. Taking him at his word, markets immediately traded the euro up, because 
investors concluded that, under these circumstances, negative rates and asset purchases would 
no longer be warranted. But the ECB quickly denied this interpretation. 
That was a mistake. It makes no sense to continue with policies designed for a thunderstorm 
when the sun is shining again. The ECB need not reverse course completely, but it could declare 
victory in the fight against deflation and start exiting its emergency policies. 
 
